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Abstract Is a higher degree of party and party system institutionalization positively correlated with the consolidation of 
democracy, defined here as the prevention of democratic breakdown? In order to answer this question, it is useful 
to compare different levels and types of institutionalization in three Southeast Asian electoral democracies. 
Institutionalized party systems are characterized, according to Main- waring and Torcal, by ‘stability of interparty 
competition.’ Moreover, the distinction made by Levitsky (‘value infusion’ versus ‘behavioural routinization’) with 
reference to the institutionalization of individual parties will be employed. The empirical research of this paper finds 
that most Indonesian parties are better institutionalized than those in the Philippines and Thailand with reference to 
‘value infusion.’ In addition, the interparty competition is more stable in Indonesia. Therefore, the probability of a 
collapse of the party system in the Philippines and Thailand is much higher. This, in turn, renders the democracies 
in these countries more fragile and prone to political crises or even sudden breakdowns. The early organizational 
consolidation of social cleavages, such as in Indonesia, enhances institutionalization. A few of the most important parties 
are socially rooted and have strong linkages to civil and/or religious organizations. Furthermore, the relationship 
between central and local elites appears to be essential: strong bosses or cliques undermine institutionalization in the 
Philippines and in Thailand, respectively. However, in recent years there has also been a tendency towards 
convergence. There are signs of regression in Indonesia, such that the future of the party system is open to question. 
This article calls for caution with respect to the stated causal relation between institutionalization and democratic 
consolidation, and it questions some aspects of the concept. 
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According to the mainstream political science literature, well-functioning political parties are 
essential for recruiting political elites, organizing opposition, resolving conflict by establishing 
channels of representation, providing accountability, and aggregating interests. They render 
possible a peaceful alternation of power, solidify democratic norms, facilitate adaptation and 
compromise and provide a sense of longevity: ‘It is impossible, for example, to “throw the 
rascals out” if they cease to exist and equally impossible for voters to perform any kind of 
retrospective evaluation of parties if the political scene is continuously refabricated’ (Lindberg 
2007: 218). Meaningfully competitive parties may even integrate veto actors like the military 
and ‘provide a check on ruling power, help ensure equity of re- sources for parties, and create 
more incentives for good governance and support for democracy’ (Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 
2005: 553). Political parties are an important link between civil society and state. Therefore, 
with reference to democratic consolidation, an analysis of the role of parties is useful. 
In this article, I first define the term ‘institutionalization’ with reference to parties and party 
systems and outline the debate regarding the assumed causal relation between 
institutionalization and democratic consolidation. The conceptualization of the latter term is 
also discussed in this section. The second part deals with the most salient characteristics of 
parties and party systems in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand with reference to ‘stability 
of interparty competition’ and ‘value infusion and behavioral routinization.’ I focus on those 
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features deemed to be characteristic and pertinent. Finally, I answer two questions: what are the 
reasons for the different levels of institutionalization? And is the causal relation between 
institutionalization and democratization as unambiguous as insinuated by different authors? It 




Institutionalization of parties and party systems 
 
Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life (North 1990: 3f.). 
Institutionalization is the process whereby ‘a practice or organization becomes well established 
and widely known, if not universally accepted’ (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006: 206). In applying 
this notion to party systems, Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) identify different dimensions. More 
institutionalized systems, according to them, are more stable; that is, patterns of party 
competition manifest more regularly. In more institutionalized systems, parties have strong 
roots in society and the voter–party linkage is closer. Political actors see parties as a legitimate, 
necessary part of democratic politics, and party organizations are not dependent on charismatic 
leaders but have instead acquired an independent status. Weakly institutionalized party systems 
generate more uncertainty in electoral outcomes and are inimical to electoral accountability. In 
contrast, institutionalized party systems are stable and parties accept the rules of the game and 
each other as legitimate. This implies that there is, if at all, only a moderate polarization. A 
relatively stable party system fosters more effective programmatic representation, party labels 
provide better programmatic cues, and electoral volatility usually decreases and ‘provides 
considerable structure to democratic politics’ (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007: 157). In such a 
system the probability that anti-system politicians can become the head of government is lower. 
Mainwaring and Torcal do not always clearly differentiate between party and party system 
institutionalization. This is the reason why the distinction made by Levitsky (‘value infusion’ 
and ‘behavioral routinization’) with reference to the institutionalization of individual parties 
will be employed. ‘Value infusion’ encompasses rootedness, that is, linkages to civil and 
religious organizations as well as ‘reification’ and ‘legitimation.’ ‘Behavioural routinization’ 
includes stable patterns of organization as well as independence from particular financiers and 
from overly powerful charismatic leaders. Value infusion denotes a ‘shift from the pursuit of 
particular objectives through an organization to the goal of perpetuating the organization per 
se’ (Levitsky 1998: 79). Being a member of it becomes a source of personal satisfaction. 
Behavioral routinization points to intra-organizational patterns of behavior, that is, to 
entrenched forms of social interaction. Whereas value infusion facilitates adaptation to new 
political environments, routinization in many cases reduces adaptability because actors face 
difficulties in changing procedures and rules (Köllner 2003; Levitsky 1998: 84). 
Competitive, institutionalized party systems are characterized by continuity among party 
alternatives and enhanced electoral accountability (Randall and Sva˚ sand 2002: 7) or, in other 
words, by ‘stability of interparty competition’ (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). It is generally 
assumed that parties fulfil their usual functions better when they and the party system as a whole 
are well-institutionalized and that a higher degree of institutionalization is positively correlated 






The thesis on the relation between institutionalization and democratic consolidation warrants 
further explanation. First, the term ‘consolidation’ has to be explicated. Then, we need to 
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understand what kinds of regimes the three cases are and what exactly the above-mentioned 
relationship could be. 
Schedler (2001) distinguishes minimalist definitions (‘preventing democratic breakdown’) 
from maximalist versions (‘organizing democracy’ or ‘deepening democracy’) of democratic 
consolidation. The minimalist definition goes back, among others, to Juan Linz, who defined 
consolidation as a state of affairs ‘in which none of the major political actors, parties or 
organized interests, forces or institutions, consider that there is an alternative to democratic 
processes to gain power . . . democracy must be seen as the “only game in town” (Linz 1990: 
156). An example of the maximalist version is the model by Linz and Stepan (1996: 17), who 
conceptualize a democracy to be consolidated when, in addition to a functioning state, 
conditions exist for the development of a free and lively civil society and a relatively 
autonomous political society; when all major political actors are subjected ‘to a rule of law that 
protects individual freedoms and associational life’; and when there is a state bureaucracy that 
is usable by the new democratic government and an institutionalized economic society. In a 
similarly ambitious way, Schneider and Schmitter (2004: 67f.) state that the consolidation of a 
democracy depends on whether all ‘significant political parties’ basically accept the existing 
constitution; whether elections have been regular, free and fair and their outcomes accepted by 
government and opposition; whether electoral volatility has diminished significantly; whether 
there has been at least one ‘rotation-in-power’ or significant shift in alliances of parties in 
power; whether elected officials and representatives are constrained in their behavior by non-
elected veto groups within the country; and whether formal or informal agreement has been 
reached over the rules governing the formation and behavior of associations, the territorial 
division of competencies and the rules of ownership and access to mass media. 
The problem with such demanding definitions is that the consolidation model may emerge ‘as 
an omnibus concept, a garbage-can concept, a catch- all concept, lacking a core meaning’ 
(Schedler 2001: 159). Often, consolidation is conceived of as a process, sometimes with an 
expected result (‘liberal democracy’), sometimes with an indeterminate outcome. The term 
consolidation tends to imply a teleological model of transition whereby a fully fledged, liberal 
democracy will almost automatically be achieved after a certain period of time (see Carothers 
2002; O’Donnell 2002). However, it should merely refer to expectations of regime continuity 
and not include other usages such as completing, organizing or deepening democracy. 
With reference to the key question of this article, we can thus define the problem as follows: is 
the probability of democratic breakdown higher in any one of the three democracies under 
consideration because of a lower level of party and party system institutionalization? 
But what kinds of democracies are these? The corpus of literature deals with intricate typologies 
of political systems and with hundreds of ‘democracies with adjectives’ (Collier and Levitsky 
1997), including, among others, ‘electoral’ (Diamond 1999), ‘delegative’ (O’Donnell 1996) 
and ‘defective’ (Merkel 2004) democracy. Moreover, there are those who prefer to speak about 
‘hybrid regimes’ that combine democratic and authoritarian features (Diamond 2002). In this 
article, the political systems of Thailand, the Philip- pines and Indonesia are defined as electoral 
democracies or polyarchies, which is essentially the same.1 According to Dahl (1989: 221) a 
polyarchy is defined by seven features: elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive 
suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative information, and 
associational autonomy. With such a minimalist definition, one avoids the trap of approaching 
the subject teleologically and overly ambitiously. 
 
 
The three test cases: Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand 
 
In this section, the stability of interparty competition shall be broadly assessed by way of tracing 
the main features of the development of the respective party systems. Then, following Levitsky, 
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two main indicators of party institutionalization will be distinguished: value infusion and 
behavioral routinization. The indicators of party system institutionalization usually preferred, 
such as fragmentation and volatility, will not be utilized here. In the Philippines, politicians 
repeatedly switch from one party to another, making it impossible to measure total electoral 
volatility (Croissant 2006: 357). In Thailand, it is more important to know the number of 
factions than to simply count party seats (Chambers 2005: 500). Electoral volatility is a very 
weak indicator if only single political parties – and not party families – are assessed. In 
Indonesia, for instance, a shift from one Islamic party to another may indicate a very moderate 
volatility in terms of identification with certain ideologies or policies. 
 
 
Stability of interparty competition 
 
In Indonesia, the underlying forces of the contemporary party system bear a striking 
resemblance to the constellation after the first free elections in 1955. Using bivariate and 
multiple regression techniques, King (2003), for instance, has shown that there was a continuity 
in the election results (1955 and 1999). He correlated support for major parties and found 
striking similarities at the district level. The results suggest that in spite of socio-economic 
shifts, fundamental loyalties to parties, essentially defined in terms of religion, have survived. 
The dynamics of party politics are thus still marked by aliran (‘streams’); that is, some of the 
biggest political parties still have a mass base and are embedded in specific milieus. 
The four most important parties, which obtained four-fifths of the total votes in 1955, grew out 
of and at the same time reshaped and politicized these streams (Feith 1962: 125ff.). The 
nationalist PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party) represented many 
non-Muslims and those who were still set apart by an aristocratic Javanese culture and earned 
their living mainly as state employees and civil servants or were clients of them. The PKI (Partai 
Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party) was probably the best-organized party, with 
loyal followers among abangan (nominal Muslim or syncretist) workers in urban and rural 
areas. The santri (orthodox Muslims) comprised modernists and traditionalists. The latter, under 
NU (Nahdatul Ulama, ‘Renaissance’ of ulama), consisted mostly of ulama (religious scholars) 
and their followers; the former, under the Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, 
Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), included urban intellectuals, traders and artisans 
on the Outer Islands. 
Although elections were held only once in the 1950s, interparty competition seemed to be 
stable. But why did the parliamentary system with rooted and – in relation to the democratic 
Philippines at that time – quite well- institutionalized parties collapse after only a few years? 
At that time it was, among other things, politik aliran, that is, the politicization of primordial 
sentiments by political parties, that added to political polarization and the demise of democracy 
and, in particular, the party system. Major political actors no longer accorded legitimacy to 
parties. 
During the authoritarian New Order (1965–98) under Suharto, the remaining organizational 
structures were destroyed. Only three parties, Golkar, the Islamic PPP (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan, United Development Party) and the secular, nationalist PDI (Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party) were legalized. The ruling party Golkar always 
obtained between 60 percent and 70 percent of the votes as a result of manipulation and 
repression. After the fall of Suharto, the party system was shaped by some of the same 
underlying conflicts, that is, between political Islam and secularism and between traditionalist 
and modernist Islam (see Table 1).2 Two of the four big parties of the 1950s have successors 
today. There is a continuation between the PNI and the PDI-P3 as well as between the NU and 
the PKB. The PKB is based on a large network of mostly rural, religious boarding schools 
(pesantren) and their charismatic principals, the kiai, and the PDI-P is a secular, nationalist 
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party thriving on the lasting charisma of former president Sukarno. The modernist camp that 
was once represented by Mayumi is now split into a few parties (PBB, PAN, PKS, and partly 
PPP), and after the brutal extinction in 1965–66, the PKI simply no longer exists. Golkar has 
taken up voters from different sources. To sum up, interparty competition is characterized by 
clear continuities when comparing the current situation with that in the 1950s. Recent surveys 
confirm these continuities (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2007). This denotes the astounding 
stability of some core patterns of the party system despite the authoritarian backlashes. 
Whereas in Indonesia basic structures could survive over a long period of time, interparty 
relations in the Philippines are marked by a history of dis- continuities. The party system that 
existed until 1972 was very different from the system that has existed since 1986, although 
formal political institutions in the two democratic periods are almost similar. 
 
Table 1 Election results in Indonesia, 1999 and 2004 (DPR, largest parties) 
 
 Votes in % Seats Votes in % Seats 
Party (1999) (1999) (2004) (2004) 
Golkar 22.5 120 21.6 128 
PDI-P 33.8 153 18.5 109 
PKB 12.6 51 10.6 52 
PPP 10.7 58 8.2 58 
PD — — 7.5 57 
PK (2004: PKS) 1.4 7 7.3 45 
PAN 7.1 34 6.4 52 
PBB 1.9 13 2.6 11 
PBR — — 2.4 13 
PDS — — 2.1 12 
Total 100 500 100 550 
Notes: Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar), Functional Groups Party; Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
– Perjuangan (PDI-P), Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle; Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), 
National Awakening Party; Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), United Develop- ment Party; 
Partai Demokrat (PD), Democrat Party; Partai Keadilan (Justice Party), in 2004: Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera (PKS), Justice and Prosperity Party; Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), National Mandate Party; 
Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), Crescent and Star Party; Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR), Star Party of 
Reform; Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS), Prosperity and Peace Party; the military automatically 
received thirty-eight seats in the period 1999–2004. 
Source: Komisi Pemilihan Umum. 
 
 
From 1907 until 1946 the NP (Nacionalista Party, founded in 1907) dominated Philippine 
politics. Power struggles arose among two factions in the party: between the followers of 
Quezon and those of Osmeña. From 1946 to 1972 a classic two-partyism – almost a copy of the 
US model – prevailed. The two contenders, the NP and the LP (Liberal Party, formerly a wing 
of the NP) were clientelistic elite parties. After 1972 and the announcement of martial law, 
elections were disallowed for six years. In 1978 manipulated elections for a rubber-stamp 
parliament were won by Marcos’s KBL (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, New Society Movement), 
which never reached the organizational density of Golkar which was supposedly one of the 
paragons of the Philippine president. Not before the early 1980s, when Marcos’s power 
increasingly crumbled, could an opposition emerge. It was able to gain 61 out of 183 seats in 
slightly competitive elections. With the ouster of Mar- cos and the beginning of democratization 
in 1986, a polarization between followers of Marcos and of Corazon Aquino materialized for a 
short time. Nevertheless, since the parties of the Left boycotted the elections, political conflicts 
were moderate. Both camps were dominated by old elites, and in the following years the ‘reform 
versus status quo’ cleavage vanished almost completely. 
Most parties in the Philippines are founded by presidential candidates. The concept of voting 
for a party – and not just for politicians – is still fairly uncommon in the Philippines. Even the 




Table 2 Seats in the House of Representatives of the Philippines (1987–2007; largest 
parties) 
Party 1987 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
PDP-Labana 43 — — — — — — 




























       
Lakas NUCD 
(since 1998: 
— 43 100 111 82 93 70 
Lakas 
NUCD-UMDP; 
since 2004: Lakas-CMD) b 
LAMMPc — — — 55 — — — 
LDPd/Lakas — — 25 — — — — 




— 34 25 9 53 53 26 
LDP — 86 17 — 21 11 3 
KAMPIe — — — — — — 47 












        
Notes: 
aPartido Demokratiko Pilipino – Lakas ng Bayan (Philippines Democratic Party – National 
Struggle). 
bLakas National Union of Christian Democrats; Lakas – Christian Muslim Democrats. 
cLaban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino, Struggle of the Nationalist Filipino Masses, comprising 
the LDP, NPC and PMP (Partido ng Masang Pilipino, Party of the Philippine Masses). 
dLaban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, Struggle for Democratic Filipinos. 
eKabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino, Partner of the Free Filipino. 
Source: Hartmann et al. (2001: 222f.); Teehankee (2002: 165; 2006: 237); House of Representatives, 
accessed at http://www.congress.gov.ph/members/index.php?name=All, 5 January 2008. 
 
landscape is labyrinthine (see Table 2). Scores of parties with almost similar but meaningless 
names compete in a highly complex electoral system every three years. This multipartism has 
in many instances even deteriorated the quality of political parties. The Lakas-NUCD-UMDP 
(since 2004, Lakas-CMD or, in short, Lakas) is a fusion of four parties. In 1992 Fidel Ramos, 
after not being nominated by the LDP as presidential candidate, engineered the fusion of the 
Partido Lakas ng Tao (People Power Party, Lakas) with the NUCD (founded in 1984) in order 
to secure registration with the legally prescribed number of party branches. The new party was 
defeated in the 1992 elections for the House of Representatives, but won the presidency. 
Afterwards, scores of MPs switched to Ramos’s party. After the elections of 1998 Lakas 
controlled the majority in the House of Representatives, but it lost the presidency to Estrada. 
His coalition, the LAMMP, was quickly able to attract MPs from Lakas. Another case in point 
is the 2004 election. Lakas, despite having won presidential elections and the majority in the 
House of Representatives, soon began to crumble. The KAMPI had attracted thirty-five 
members by mid-August. Including those MPs with double memberships (Lakas-KAMPI and 
NPC-KAMPI), the total number of members was sixty-seven. In this case, it was the task of the 
KAMPI to counterbalance José de Venecia, the speaker of the House of Representatives. Parties 
with elaborated political platforms such as the Leftist Akbayan or Bayan Muna have gained 
access to the national parliament only because of the introduction of the party-list system in 
1998. The major shortcomings of Philippine parties persist. With respect to ‘stability of 
interparty competition,’ the party system is hardly institutionalized. 
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In Thailand, political party activities began after the Second World War but were soon ended 
by the coup in 1947. In 1951, after a short period of pseudo-parliamentary rule, political parties 
were banned. Following another short parliamentary phase from 1955 to 1957, political parties 
were again forbidden, first under Field Marshal Sarit, then under Field Marshals Thanom and 
Praphat, until 1969. In 1971, the next coup and ban on parties followed. Other than the 
Democrat Party, ‘no party had much institutional continuity prior to the 1970s’ (Ockey 2005: 
745). Political parties only flourished in 1975–76 and played a central, though somewhat 
limited, role in the semi- democratic regime of the 1980s. Only with the democratization in 
1992 did they truly take center stage. 
At face value, there was a certain continuity in the 1990s. In the elections of September 1992, 
July 1995, and November 1996 electoral volatility was, in comparison with other young 
democracies, moderate. But even this fragile stability withered in the wake of the constitutional 
amendments of 1997 (Case 2001: 534ff.). With his new party, the Thai Rak Thai (‘Thais Love 
Thais,’ TRT), media mogul and billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra won (McCargo and 
Pathmanand 2005: 70ff.) 248 out of 500 seats in the House of Representatives in the January 
2001 polls and was able to gradually enlarge his majority (see Table 3). The vacuum of 
deinstitutionalized party systems is filled by ‘pluto’ populism (Phongpaichit and Baker 2002; 
Thompson 2007), not Peronist populism; that is, organized labour is eschewed. The best ex- 
amples are Thaksin as well as Estrada and Fernando Poe in the Philippines. Thaksin arose as a 
populist leader, even in a parliamentary system. He and Estrada were able to totally undermine 
the already shaky ground of partisan politics. 
 
Table 3 Seats in the Thai House of Representatives (1992–2007; largest parties) 
 
 1992 1995 1996 2001 2005 2007 
Total 360 391 393 500 500 480 
New Aspiration Party 51 57 125 36 a – 
Democrat Party 79 86 123 128 96 165 
National Development Party 60 53 52 29 a 9b 
(Chart Pattana)       
Thai Nation (Chart Thai) 77 92 39 41 25 37 
Social Action Party 22 22 20 1 — — 
Moral Force (Palang Dharma) 47 23 1 — — — 
Thai Citizen Party 3 18 18 — — — 
Thais Love Thais (Thai Rak Thai) — — — 248 377 — 
People’s Power Party — — — — — 233 
For the Motherland (Puea Pandin) — — — — — 24 
Notes: 
a Fusion with Thai Rak Thai. 
bThais United National Development Party: a merger of Thais United and the National 
Development Party. 
Source: Chambers (2006); Orathai (2002); Election Commission of Thailand, accessed at www.ect.go.th 
 
 
Before Thaksin, the party system was weakly institutionalized with respect to the stability of 
interparty competition. Under him, alternatives vanished almost completely. The fragility of the 
Thai party system was made all the more evident in 2006 when the military toppled him amidst 
mass demonstrations. Elections which had earlier been boycotted by the opposition parties were 
then annulled by the Constitutional Court. It also ordered the dissolution of the TRT. One 
hundred and eleven senior party executives of the TRT were banned from electoral politics for 
five years. Parties had to start from scratch, under martial law. Momentarily, the People’s Power 





Value infusion and behavioral routinization 
 
At the background of this sketch of party systems, one can start to measure the 
institutionalization of individual parties by the degree of value infusion as indicated by 
rootedness: linkages to civil and religious organizations. More- over, the other factor, 
behavioral routinization, denotes stable patterns of organization as well as independence from 
powerful financiers and charismatic leaders. 
Thai parties are poorly institutionalized with reference to these indicators (Bünte 2000; Ockey 
2003; Orathai 2002; Thornton 2003). A number of par- ties were established and won seats, but 
quickly vanished; examples include Palang Dharma, the Social Action Party, the Thai Citizen 
Party, and, recently, the Chart Pattana Party and the New Aspiration Party. Social cleavages are 
only rudimentarily represented in the parliament (Ockey 2005). Exceptions are, for instance, 
regional cleavages: the Democrat Party has a stronghold in the south, whilst the New Aspiration 
Party achieved their best results in the north-east of the country. The polarization between 
‘angels’ and ‘devils,’ that is, between the pro-democratic and status quo-oriented parties of 
1992, no longer plays a role. 
Generally, parties are only shallowly rooted and are organizationally weak, in particular outside 
Bangkok. The linkage between politicians and voters is provided by local political cliques 
(phuak, phakphuak) via vote canvassers (hua khanaen) (Nelson 2001: 315ff.). The phuak are 
informal groupings and consist of headmen, members of the local administration, and 
councillors. They may cover the whole province or just parts of it. Some- times individuals or 
families form the core of the phuak; sometimes different groups control the territory. MPs 
belong to the phuak or are selected as their leaders. These local elites – powerful local political-
bureaucratic and business alliances – gained importance in the 1980s and 1990s and achieved 
‘a significant degree of autonomy from Bangkok politics’ (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005: 269f.; 
Phongpaichit and Baker 2000: 332ff.). In many cases, these local and regional patronage 
networks weaken the central party leadership and ‘[i]ntra-party factions, led by regional 
personages, have provided the lion’s share of party financing and have dominated candidate 
nomination decisions’ (Chambers 2006: 309). 
McCargo distinguishes between real, authentic and actual parties. ‘Real’ parties are marked by 
‘mass membership, sophisticated administrative structure, local branches, representative 
leadership, ideological cohesion and concrete policy platforms’ (McCargo 1997: 115). He states 
that mass bureaucratic parties of this type have never been created successfully in Thailand. 
‘Authentic’ parties are dominated by personalities and are characterized by the huge influence 
of money. Some scholars argue that they are appropriate to the socio-economic order of 
Thailand and refer to the role of factions, of regional groupings and the links to the business 
sector. ‘Actual’ parties are ‘uneasy composites of both the “real” and the “authentic”’ (McCargo 
1997: 121f.). Examples of ‘authentic parties’ are Samakkhi Tham, Social Action and Chart 
Thai. The latter was founded in 1974 as a ‘law and order’ party. In 1991–92 it supported 
Suchinda and his suppression of popular protests. The structure is not unlike that of parties of 
notables: 
 
Chart Thai describes itself as a ‘family’ rather than an institution 
.. . This informal nature influences all aspects of the Party’s structure and decision-
making . . . There is no real election for candidates by the party members. In fact, the 
party believes that if the branches deter- mined candidates, there would be conflict 
within the party. (Thornton 2003: 414) 
 
Examples of ‘actual’ parties are New Aspiration, the Democrats and Palang Dharma. The latter 
was established in 1988 by Major General Cham- long, at that time the governor of Bangkok, 
and was completely focused on him as a charismatic leader. Chamlong stood as a devout ascetic 
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for ‘clean’ politics and succeeded in recruiting highly motivated members of the Santi Asoke 
sect. 
The Democrat Party, founded in 1946, is the only one with a long tradition. It was actively 
involved in the student protests in 1973 and backed, although hesitantly, the demonstrations 
against General Suchinda at the beginning of the 1990s. At the height of the Asian crisis it 
advocated a neo-liberal economic policy close to IMF formulae. It still maintains a major base 
in the south, and possesses strong backing among the urban middle class. Regular replacement 
of party leaders hints at a lively intraparty democratic culture. The Democrat Party is the best-
institutionalized party in Thailand. 
In addition to his classification of parties, as outlined above, McCargo foresaw the rise of 
electoral-professional parties (Panebianco 1988). He was later vindicated by the rise of the 
TRT. Such parties are dominated by professional politicians who work together with media, 
marketing and advertising specialists. The leadership is personalized, the party is linked directly 
to voters and the membership is small. The parties are funded by interest groups and campaign 
around particular issues. They use polling and focus groups and are not particularly interested 
in formal membership and party structures; and they are not based on ideologies, but rather on 
certain marketable issues (McCargo and Pathmanand 2005: 78). The TRT was financed almost 
exclusively by Thaksin and his wife. The party, which paid its MPs additional salaries, won 
almost half of the seats in 2001 and more than three-quarters of the mandate in 2005. 
Nonetheless, it was not well institutionalized. In 2004, the TRT claimed a membership of some 
15 million, yet party organization was rudimentary. In contrast to the Democrat Party, which 
had 193 branches in 400 constituencies, the TRT comprised just twelve regional coordination 
centers (Phongpaichit and Baker 2004: 191). In addition, the party was undermined by 
factionalism. In 2006 it consisted of twelve factions. The biggest of them consisted of sixty to 
seventy representatives led by Sanoh Thienthong, who had come from the New Aspiration 
Party. The TRT was also special in so far as it was actually two parties in one with a dual 
structure consisting of an electoral-professional part in Bangkok and a rural network part 
operating in the countryside. 
What most Thai parties have in common is that they are feebly institutionalized in terms of 
value infusion and behavioral routinization. The same is true of Philippine parties. Today, in 
comparison to the time prior to 1972, they are ‘less the unified patronage parties of old than 
coalitions of factions and smaller parties kept tenuously together by patronage and pork barrel 
politics’ (Abinales and Amoroso 2005: 239). 
The two-partyism of the pre-Marcos period was fluid in so far as politicians frequently switched 
from one party to the other. Hopping from the NP to the LP or vice versa, sometimes repeatedly, 
was a widespread phenomenon. The two parties had almost the same vaguely formulated 
platforms and thus were instruments for presidents and cliques, but did not reflect societal 
cleavages. Consequently, the elites did not face challenges to their rule. After 1986, that is after 
the destruction of the Nacionalistas and the Liberals, a plethora of new parties was established 
because a reversion to the pre-Marcos era was impossible: 
 
Politicians were powerful within their realms (provinces, cities, and municipalities), but 
their ties to the national state were no longer coursed through a single patronage 
machine. Instead, a mélange of small parties with constantly shifting memberships 
created short-lived, election- based alliances. (Abinales and Amoroso 2005: 239) 
 
The largest political parties in the Philippines today are still characterized by a lack of 
meaningful platforms, by a high frequency of party switching and factionalism, as well as by 
numerous dissolutions and re-emergences (Arlegue and Coronel 2003; Rocamora 2000; 
Teehankee 2006). An important reason for party switching and the shift from one coalition to 
another are porkbarrels, that is, special financial resources controlled by the president (as 
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Countryside Development Funds and Congressional Initiative Allocations). They can be used 
inter alia for the more or less legal maintenance of networks. Only 40 percent of the expenses 
from the presidential development funds trickle down to the local level; the remainder are lost 
on the way through party and administrative coffers (Arlegue and Coronel 2003: 225). 
Moreover, the president has the capability to deliver around 100,000 jobs. Another rea- son for 
the weak institutionalization of parties is the enormous campaign expenses. Parties are financed 
by their MPs, their candidates, and sponsors. Most parties are established in Manila and serve 
as electoral vehicles. However, they generally do not exist for a long time, and the central 
executive’s control of the party apparatus is much weaker because the 
 
organizational structure of Philippine parties is generally defined by parochial, 
clientelistic networks centering upon individual parliamentarians, whose affiliation to 
the national party is rather loose 
.. . [L]egislators and candidates enjoy a remarkable degree of independence and 
autonomy from their parties. (Croissant 2003: 81f.) 
 
Family networks often displace parties as channels of political recruitment. The major parties 
are still under the control of a few dozen of these dynasties (Aquino, Cojuangco, Osmeña, 
Romualdez, Marcos, Lopez, Enrile, etc.), supplemented only by some professionals as well as 
TV, movie and sports stars. 
Multiple party memberships indicate the weak loyalty of politicians to parties. The parties are 
mostly inactive between elections, and membership figures are low, as are levels of 
organization. The Omnibus Election Code even allows parties to nominate non-members as 
candidates. Most parties are managed in Manila and are not intended to exist for a long time. 
The presidential candidate and some national political leaders determine the selection of 
candidates. Parties, prior to the polls, are political machines. In the parliament they serve as the 
interest organizations of MPs seeking easy access to financial sources. Since the president does 
not control an efficient party machinery, he or she is dependent on local elites when it comes to 
voter mobilization (Teehankee 2006: 250). Campaigning is focused on the candidates, not on 
the parties. The party apparatus is financially ill-equipped between elections. The congresses 
of Lakas, for example, could not take place every two years as stipulated in official party 
regulations because of a lack of financial resources. Rocamora (2000) states that two years after 
the 1998 elections the LAMMP did not have a party constitution, officers or headquarters. 
Consequently, the party fell apart after a short time. 
The focus on presidential candidates, the ephemerality of political parties in general, the weak 
linkages to social and religious organizations, and the inchoate translation of social cleavages 
into the party system prevent parties from engaging in the difficult task of devising intricate 
programmes. Several parties even hire the same group of consultants to write their party 
platforms (Hicken 2006: 38). There is no general party law in the Philippines. Parties have to 
present financial reports only during elections, and violations are seldom penalized since the 
election commission COMELEC has limited enforcement capacities. Parties have to establish 
branches in most regions, but again these regulations are rarely implemented. 
Seen against this background, the state of political parties in Indonesia is much better. Many of 
the big parties in Indonesia are rooted, have substantial linkages to civil and religious 
organizations and are reified in the public mind. At present, among the ten largest parties, six 
are Islamic and four secular. The most important cleavage structuring the party system as a 
whole is still that dividing secular and Islamic parties, and among the latter, in addition, that 
between moderate Islamic and Islamist parties (Ananta et al. 2004; Johnson Tan 2006; Sherlock 
2005). The degree of institutionalization of these ten parties is uneven and depends, among 
other things, on their rootedness in specific milieus and their recent history, that is, whether 
they had already existed under the New Order regime (1965–98). The PDI- P, with a large 
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following of Christians and secularists, is still identified with Sukarno, the immensely popular 
and charismatic first president of Indonesia whose peculiar worldview – a strange mix of old 
patrimonial Javanese, socialist and fiercely anti-colonial nationalist ideas – serves as one pillar 
of the party’s programmatic platform. Today, his daughter Megawati embodies this Sukarnoist 
tradition. 
Islamic and Islamist parties have arguably stronger social roots, in particular those with links 
to mass organizations and social milieus where people with similar backgrounds, outlooks and 
lifestyles tend to have almost similar political preferences. The PKB, the party of the fourth 
Indonesian president, Abdurrahman Wahid, evolved out of the largest mass organization, the – 
according to its own figures – 40 million-member, traditionalist Islamic NU. The NU and the 
PKB are not identical. During elections, for example, a whole range of ‘NU parties’ take part. 
Only a strong minority of NU members actually votes for the PKB, but the connections between 
the NU and the PKB in terms of general outlook, leadership personnel and political visions is 
obvious. The ulama of the NU (and the PKB) are of- ten owners and principals of Muslim 
boarding schools (pesantren), most of them located in rural Central and East Java. The other 
Muslim party with clear connections to an Islamic mass organization is PAN, the antagonist of 
the PKB. The PAN is linked to the urban, modernist Islamic organization Muhammadiyah, 
founded even before the NU and with a mass membership of allegedly some 35 million. 
However, this overall optimistic view on Indonesian parties has to be qualified. In comparison 
to the 1950s, there are clear indications of a de-alignment of Indonesian parties in spite of the 
notable aliran persistence (Ufen 2008). After 1998, parties are more dominated by charismatic 
leaders, and factionalization is a recurrent problem. Intraparty authoritarianism and personalism 
is obvious. ‘Money politics’ with bought candidacies, MPs acting as brokers for private 
companies, businessmen taking over party chairmanships, and billionaire financiers 
determining policies behind the scenes are far more pronounced today. Because of a general 
devaluation of ideologies, political platforms are generally poor. Parties cooperate in grand 
coalitions, avoid the formation of an organized opposition and collude in tolerating corruption. 
The financing of parties in general is dubious: many of them rely for campaigning on unknown 
financiers, and regulations to control these external cash flows are seldom enforced. 
Membership fees are mostly insignificant, as is public funding. In recent years some 
businessmen have even become party chiefs, for example Yusuf Kalla (Golkar) and Sutrisno 
Bachir (PAN). In most parties crucial decisions are made by some of the core executive 
members, who are usually loyal to one charismatic leader. Usually, regulations on how to 
conduct party congresses are unclear and are prone to manipulation (Notosusanto 2005). 
Almost all parties have their power center in Jakarta and chastise recalcitrant members. One 
means of doing so is recalling parliamentarians, that is, terminating their mandate and replacing 
them. 
During the presidential elections in 2004 a trend towards personalization (Mujani and Liddle 
2007) due to the impact of the mass media was evident. The Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party), 
for instance, which is almost completely dependent on Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was set 
up as a vehicle for the first direct presidential elections. Furthermore, the first direct elections 
of regional heads (governors, district chiefs and mayors), the pilkada, which started in 2005, 
have weakened local and regional party leaders in comparison to the candidates, because many 
of the latter did not have a strong party background but were chosen among independent civil 
servants or businessmen (Mietzner 2008; Rinakit 2005). 
The two largest parties today, Golkar and the PDI-P, provide particular evidence of the trend 
towards ‘money politics’ and clientelism. The PDI- P, banned as the only real opposition party 
(then as the PDI) in the last years of the New Order, has lost most of its reform vigour. The 
Megawati government (2001–04) had a dubious track record because military reforms were 
delayed and the heavy-handed policy on regions such as Aceh and Papua even intensified. 
Golkar, in the New Order period the ruling party and an assemblage of so-called functional 
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groups, is more a clientelist machine than a platform-based ‘classical’ party (Tomsa 2006). 
Nonetheless, a fair degree of party and party system institutionalization has been achieved in 
Indonesia, where the party system is characterized by clearly visible cleavages. Many parties 
are rooted in social milieus. These linkages provide a comparatively strong infusion of values 
and foster, in spite of recent counter-tendencies, a fair routinization. There is an evident 
continuity among party alternatives reaching back to the 1950s. This is in marked contrast to 
the Philippines and Thailand. In the Philippines, the post-1986 system is not reminiscent of that 
of the pre-Marcos period and has shifted continuously. In Thailand, the party system has 
collapsed just recently. Previously, it had evolved from 2001 onwards into a system dominated 
by one party, the TRT, thus reversing the weak tendency towards a stabilization of interparty 
competition that was evident in the 1990s. For voters, the fluid configurations in the Philippines 
and Thailand have generally provided neither policy preference predictability nor clear and 
stable expectations about the behavior of political actors. 
As to the institutionalization of individual parties, most Indonesian parties are socially rooted 
and better linked to different kinds of civil society and religious organizations. Even in terms 




Causes of institutionalization 
 
The structure and performance of political parties has to be seen against the background of other 
structural and institutional factors (Stockton 2001: 117). This will be made clearer with an 
analysis of the interdependent factors that are of particular importance for the different levels 
of institutionalization. 
One crucial factor is the early political mobilization and the resulting translation of social 
cleavages into the party system. In the case of Indonesia, political parties and mass 
organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama arose long before independence. 
These highly politicized, mostly anti-colonial, nationalist organizations were socially 
entrenched and capable of mobilizing large parts of the population. In Thailand, the national 
elite were able to retain their power unimpeded by colonial rulers so that the ensuing 
‘bureaucratic polity’ would, for a long time, stave off extra-bureaucratic forces such as political 
parties. In Indonesia the early institutionalization of societal cleavages after independence 
enabled the crystallization of a party system with relatively stable patterns of competition. 
Another factor is the strength of local elites. This is still fractured and relatively weak in 
Indonesia. Reasons for this, besides the above-mentioned early mobilization and translation of 
cleavages into the party system, are the heritage of New Order centralism and, particularly, the 
lack of a strong locally based bourgeoisie. Institutionalization is hampered in Thailand and the 
Philippines by the existence of highly influential local and regional elites, whereas in Indonesia 
strong countervailing civil society forces alleviate local strongmen rule (Sidel 2004). Whilst in 
the Philippines military, administrative and economic elites have been able to dominate parties 
since their inception (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2002), in Indonesia politicians with lower- and 
middle-class backgrounds are more capable of rising through the ranks of party organizations. 
In Thailand, strong local elites arose in the 1980s, along with the establishment of a semi-
democracy with competitive elections. In contrast to the Philippines, these elites emerged 
relatively late and in a parliamentary system with a centralized bureaucracy where local 
executive powers are wielded by civilian bureaucrats. The local elites dominated multi-member 
constituencies and were thus able to take control of factions, parties, and ministries in Bangkok 
in fluid coalition governments (Sidel 1999: 150f.). Although Thaksin was able to hold sway 




For Sidel, the emergence of bosses is essentially dependent on a specific sequencing, that is, 
the imposition of formal electoral democratic institutions upon an underdeveloped state 
apparatus at an early phase of capitalist development (Sidel 1999: 13). From the beginning, 
strong local elites have captured political parties as power bases. Elected officials have gained 
executive control over local state agencies. If we translate Sidel’s assumption into the analysis 
of political parties, we witness in the Philippines and in Thailand the subordination of the 
national party apparatus to local and regional leaders with disastrous effects on party and party 
system institutionalization. In contrast, in Indonesia local mafias have so far been quickly 
subordinated to centralized national (party-)state apparatuses.4 
At the national level another important deinstitutionalizing factor is a close relationship between 
capital and the political class. In Indonesia a marked de-alignment process has arguably been 
caused by the ‘rise of capital,’ that is, a growing symbiosis of entrepreneurs and politicians. In 
the 1950s, Dutch companies controlled most capital-intensive sections of the economy. The 
ethnic Chinese and indigenous (pribumi) businessmen were too weak to exercise much 
influence on governments (Feith 1962: 105). They arose as a powerful class in the New Order 
and are now increasingly able to influence political parties. This domination is still not fully 
developed, whereas it has been typical in the Philippines from the beginning and in Thailand at 
least since the 1980s. 
Other reasons for the hampering of party institutionalization in the three countries are eroding 
traditional relationships and the rise of the mass media. According to Manacsa (1999: 202ff.), 
in the Philippines after 1986 political parties and the party system have changed inter alia 
because of the weakening of traditional patron–client bonds as well as the rise of powerful TV 
newscasters and entertainment stars. The family clans still dominate the political landscape, but 
now they have begun to compete with celebrities and professionals. In Thailand, the TRT was 
the direct offshoot of Thaksin’s media empire. In Indonesia, the spread of mass education and 
the mass media together with the globalization of Islam have weakened the old religious 
establishment and elevated new Muslim leaders, many of whom are without a deep religious 
knowledge. 
It is more difficult to assess the impact of formal institutions. With reference to their five case 
studies (India, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand), Rüland et al. (2005: 271) 
state that the party system reflected in the legislature ‘is primarily an expression of the extent 
to which societal cleavages are transformed into political parties but also of the electoral 
system,’ whereas in most cases there is no clear causal link between the system of government 
and party cohesion. Arguably, in Thailand and the Philip- pines the role of local elites is, among 
other things, more important because of the election system. But even the effects of electoral 
systems in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines are, I would argue, of limited importance. 
The multipartyism in Indonesia, for example, is not simply the result of but also at least as much 
the cause of the proportional system. According to neo-institutionalists, institutions are 
endogenous; that is, ‘their form and their functioning depend on the conditions under which 
they emerge and endure’ (Przeworski 2004: 527). The choice of the proportional representation 
system after independence and again in 1998–99 was due to the high number of relevant 
political actors. The introduction of a majority system, in contrast, seems to be more probable 
if there are just two major players. Besides, the limited influence of presidentialism and 
parliamentarianism can be deducted cautiously from the somewhat similar deficiencies of 
political parties and the party systems in Thailand and the Philippines. This is not to fully deny 
the significance of formal institutional factors. The design of proportional representation in 
Indonesia, for example, strengthens political parties, in particular their central executives in 
Jakarta. Indonesian parliamentarians have a much weaker power base than in the Philippines 
and Thailand, where congressmen and MPs are elected directly with a majority system. The 
direct election of regional heads in Indonesia since 2005 may, in the long run, change at least 
the standing of local elites. The thesis that proportional representation tends to buttress the 
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institutionalization of parties is at least partly vindicated by experiences in Indonesia and in the 





Regarding the dimensions of party and party system institutionalization, almost all Southeast 
Asian parties are weakly institutionalized, particularly with reference to their behavioral 
routinization. Indonesia is an exception in that the patterns of competition are relatively regular 
and a few of the large parties are to a certain extent still rooted in society. So far, patterns of 
party competition have manifested regularly and the voter–party linkage has been quite strong. 
Despite pronounced struggles between party factions and clearly visible tendencies towards de-
alignment, parties are still established in the public mind as representatives of specific streams 
(aliran) or milieus. In contrast, a stable party system does not exist in the Philippines or 
Thailand. But what does that tell us about the relation between institutionalization and 
democratic consolidation? Is a reversal to authoritarianism less likely in Indonesia than in the 
Philippines or Thailand? Cautiously, the question can be answered in the affirmative. The 
probability that a better-institutionalized party system is positively correlated with a less-fragile 
democratic regime is 
high, and the three test cases support the hypothesis. 
For Aspinall (2005), the 2004 polls marked the end of Indonesia’s political transition. Tomsa 
(2006) concludes that the polity at present can safely be labelled an ‘electoral democracy.’ 
Webber (2006) sees Indonesia as a ‘patrimonial democracy’ which has developed many 
attributes of a consolidated democracy. Although corruption is pervasive, the rule of law weak, 
and the government’s effective capacity to govern limited, he expects a push in a more liberal 
direction. Indonesia is now arguably, with reference to the Freedom House ratings for political 
rights and civil liberties, the most democratic country in Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, the 
political situation is as volatile as ever. People Power Two and Three, a spate of political 
killings, the state of emergency in February 2006, successive impeachment bids against Arroyo, 
and coup attempts by the military are testimony to the fragile state of its democracy.5 In 
Thailand, the most recent Freedom House ratings for political rights declined from 3 to 7 and 
those for civil liberties from 3 to 4. The military coup against Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra, the abrogation of the Constitution, the dissolution of parliament and the 
Constitutional Court, and the ensuing collapse of the party system indicate the striking frailty 
of the polity. 
In the Philippines as well as in Thailand, the weakness of the party system was a major factor 
in these crises. Thaksin was toppled after he had easily overwhelmed a range of clientelist 
parties and had begun to destroy core institutions of the electoral democracy. In the Philippines, 
politics is determined by fights among clans and is, thus, extremely unpredictable. In obvious 
contrast, major shifts in the structure of the Indonesian party system are far less probable. But, 
again, this may change in the long run, because some of the patterns buttressing political parties 
in Indonesia are increasingly being undermined. 
Moreover, the stated causal mechanism linking institutionalization and democratic 
consolidation is weaker than is often assumed. One of the best- rooted parties in Indonesia today 
has a dubious past and is prone to de- fend the privileges of New Order elites (Golkar); another 
demonstrates a shallow commitment to the multi-religious compromise enshrined in the 
constitution (PKS). Could it be that the institutionalization of political parties in specific 
configurations even obstructs democratic consolidation? Mainwaring (1997) has stated that 
greater institutionalization is not always better because it may lead to the ossification of party 
structures. In like manner, Johnson Tan (2006) rightly notes that the rootedness of Indonesian 
parties at times even heightens social conflicts. And Brownlee (2007: 218f.) has observed that 
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parties often play a vital role in facilitating the maintenance of electoral authoritarian regimes. 
Accordingly, political parties in electoral democracies may strengthen the impact of 
questionable features of the regime, for instance clientelism and ‘money politics.’ The 
originally formulated and in the political science corpus often repeated statement regarding the 
aforementioned causal mechanism has thus to be qualified. 
In this vein, Schedler (2001: 161) warns against the confusion of the consolidation of ‘partial 
regimes’ with that of democracy as a whole, for ‘a democracy may be secure against reversals 
even if its party system is still inchoate and fluid; and conversely, a democracy may break down 
even if its party system is highly institutionalized.’ Political parties as major actors in the 
political society are only one component of democratic consolidation. If one looks at the whole 
political system, a low number of veto actors and, particularly, a military controlled by civil 
authorities are beneficial. And if other ‘partial regimes’ are included in the analysis, it is 
probable that a consolidated rechtsstaat, an advantageous social structure, the absence of 
political violence and fierce class struggle, and an efficient and uncorrupted state ad- 
ministration all buttress directly or indirectly the democraticness of political parties and the 
party system. 
In addition, the study of underlying structural causes of institutionalization processes reveals 
that a high degree of party and party system institutionalization is dependent on the effective 
translation of social cleavages into the party system. This, again, is contingent upon the power 
of local elites, the impact of huge entrepreneurs on party activities, and formal institutional 
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Notes 
1 Thailand has been categorized as an electoral democracy for most of the time since 
1992 and can be classified as such after the elections in December 2007. 
2 See Baswedan (2004); Johnson Tan (2006); King (2003); Sherlock (2005). 
3 On the full names of political parties for all three countries see Tables 1–3. 
4 Mainwaring and Zoco (2007: 171f.) also see timing and sequence of the formation of 
democratic regimes and parties as critical explanatory variables. 
5 To be sure, the toppling of Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001 by the People’s Congress also 
indicated major weaknesses of the political system. But since then impeach- ment 
procedures have been newly defined so that the once-volatile relation be- tween the 
presidency and the legislature has been stabilized. 
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